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THE CONVERSION OF ORDINARY INCOME TO
CAPITAL GAIN BY INTENTIONALLY AVOIDING




The emphasis has long been on how to transfer property to a controlled
corporation without causing recognition of income to the transferor. The
effort is usually to urge careful compliance with the terms of section 3511 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 19542 to insure the tax-free status of the
transfer. It may be that all too little emphasis has been placed on the tax
benefits that can arise from having the transfer either partially or fully
taxable.
The tax benefits that may flow from a taxable rather than a non-taxable
transaction depend to a large extent on the particular facts and the nature
*Member of the firm of Smith, Schwegler & Schwantzman, Kansas City,
Missouri.
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 351 provides as follows:
TRANSFER TO CORPORATION CONTROLLED BY TRANSFEROR.
(a) General Rule.-No gain or loss shall be recognized if property
is transferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange
for stock or securities in such corporation and immediately after the ex-
change such person or persons are in control (as defined in section 368(c))
of the corporation. For purposes of this section, stock or securities issued
for services shall not be considered as issued in return for property.
(b) Receipt of Property.-If subsection (a) would apply to an ex-
change but for the fact that there is received, in addition to the stock or
securities permitted to be received under subsection (a), other property
or money, then-
(1) gain (if any) to such recipient shall be recognized, but
not in excess of-(A) the amount of money received, plus
(B) the fair market value of such other property re-
ceived; and(2) no loss to such recipient shall be recognized.
(c) Special Rule.-In determining control, for purposes of this sec-
tion, the fact that any corporate transferor distributes part of all of the
stock which it receives in the exchange to its shareholders shall not be
taken into account.
2. All references to the "Code" (or to "sections" thereof) shall mean the
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of the taxpayer's business. One of the most popular situations is the taxable
transfer of low-basis real property (non-depreciable) to a controlled cor-
poration organized for the purpose of improving, subdividing, and selling
lots. The objective is to step up the basis of the real property at the cost
of a capital gains tax, and thus isolate a portion of the appreciation in value
as capital gain in the hands of the shareholder rather than ordinary income
in the hands of the corporation.
Example:
The typical transaction may look as follows: Subdividers, Inc.,
is in the business of buying property, subdividing it, and selling
house lots to individual builders. All the stock is owned by Mr.
Investor. Mr. Investor is not a dealer for federal income tax
purposes. Some time ago Mr. Investor acquired as an investment
a parcel of realty now ripe for subdivision. He originally paid
$100,000 for the parcel, and he has had offers to sell it for $200,000.
He feels that with a well-conceived subdivision plan he could sell
the individual lots for a gross amount of approximately $400,000
and projects his cost of subdividing and improving at about
$100,000.
(1) If Mr. Investor contributes the property to the
corporation under section 351, the tax results will be as follows.
Mr. Investor realizes no tax. Subdivider's, Inc., will hold the
property at a basis of $100,000. Its tax profits upon the sale of all
the lots would be $200,000 ($400,000 minus $100,000 basis in land
plus $100,000 cost of improving). Taxed at present corporate
rates (in one year), the total tax would be $89,500.
2) If Mr. Investor sells the property to Subdivider's, Inc., for
$200,000 cash, he will recognize an immediate capital gain of
$25,000. Subdividers, Inc., will then hold the property at a basis
of $200,000. The corporation upon selling all lots will show a tax
profit of $100,000 ($400,000 less $200,000 basis in land plus
$100,000 cost of improving). The tax to the corporation would be
$41,500, and the total tax to both the corporation and Mr. Investor
would then be $66,500 (or $33,000 less than under section 351).
Of course, in numerous other fact situations the tax benefits could be
weighty.3 The benefits of transferring depreciable property in a taxable
transaction have been rendered sufficiently less attractive by the enactment
3. The tax benefits that flow from a taxable transaction basically result
from stepping up the basis of the assets transferred, i.e., more depreciation and less
gain on future sales. If the taxable transaction is achieved via the sale technique
rather than certain of the other alternatives available, the tax benefits include
those provided by the presence of a sizeable amount of debt in the capital struc-
ture of the corporation.
[Vol. 32
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AVOIDING SECTION 351
of section 12394 and sections 12455 and 1250.6 A taxable transaction is
normally beneficial only when the transferor is seeking recognition of a
potential gain rather than a potential loss on the transaction. The loss may
be unallowable in many of these transactions either because of section 3517
or section 267.8
The opportunities for achieving a taxable event on the transfer of
property to a corporation can generally be categorized as follows: (1) Sales
of property to a controlled corporation; (2) Boot transactions; (3) Trans-
fers of properties with liabilities in excess of basis; (4) Intentional failure
to meet "control" requirements. Some of these transactions are less useful
than others. Each will be considered herein.
II. SALES TO A CONTROLLED CORPORATION
By far the most common device employed to avoid intentionally section
351 upon the transfer of property to a controlled corporation is a "sale"
(as opposed to an equity contribution). In light of its frequent use and the
benefits it offers if employed successfully, the bulk of this effort will be
devoted to a consideration of this technique of avoiding the tax-free pro-
visions of section 351.
The normal procedure is formation of the corporation under state
law, contributions of some property to it in exchange for stock, and the
sale of an additional amount of property to the corporation for cash and
notes. The gain (assumed to be capital) on the property sold is taxed under
sections 1001 and 1002, and the corporation holds the property at a basis
equal to the price (i.e., "cost") it paid.9 The "sale" technique also offers
4. Section 1239 generally provides that in a transaction between certain
related individuals or between an individual and a controlled corporation gain
from the sale or exchange of property, which in the hands of the transferee is of a
character that is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in § 167, will
be considered as gain from the sale or exchange of property that is neither a
capital asset nor a § 1231 asset.
5. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 1245 pertaining to the recapture of deprecia-
tion upon the disposition of certain depreciable personal property.
6. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1250 pertaining to the recapture of de-
preciation upon the disposition of certain depreciable realty.
7. Irr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 351(b)(2) provides that no loss will be
recognized in a § 351 transfer, even if boot is distributed.
8. INT. RE V. CoDE oF 1954, § 267(a) (1) provides that no deduction shall
be allowed in respect of losses from sales or exchanges of property between those
related individuals and organizations specified in § 267(b). Section 267(b)(2)
specifically provides as one such relationship, referred to in subsection (a), an
individual and a corporation in which such individual directly or indirectly owns
fifty per cent in value of the outstanding stock. Section 267(c) provides its own
constructive ownership rules.
9. See INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 1012.
1967]
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the advantage of reporting the gain on the installment method' ° and
thereby deferring payment of a portion of the tax to years when cash is
available. In other words, the "sale" technique offers the opportunity to
isolate as a capital gain a portion of what would have been ordinary income
of the corporation if the same property had been transferred under section
351.
There are two caveats to this last general statement. First, this tech-
nique has not gone unmolested by either the Internal Revenue Service or
the courts. The attack has normally been based on the contention that what
purported to be a sale for cash and notes was for tax purposes to be treated
as an equity contribution. 1 Each decision has for the most part been
limited to its particular fact situation, and only a close analysis of the
cases in this area will reveal the guidelines to be followed in attempting to
plan such a transaction. Second, the taxpayer must be careful when planning
a transfer that will purposely avoid section 351 that he is not lured into
the pitfalls created by sections 1239, 1245 and 1250.
The courts have developed a number of factors which they consider
in determining whether a given fact situation constitutes, as a matter of
law, a sale or an equity contribution. It should be noted that the decisions
have not provided the taxpayer with a uniform test or list of factors
around which he can plan with any degree of certainty. Furthermore, an
attempt here to reconcile all of the decisions would be fruitless. Part of the
problem is that the courts have failed to a large extent to define precisely
either the meaning of or the rationale supporting the various factors they
employ in their "balance of factors" approach to this issue. Yet to discuss
the sale versus equity contribution question without attempting to provide
the planner with some sensible guides or tests would not be meaningful. In
discussing the various factors presented by the courts, the attempt will be:
(i) to evaluate the factors that are considered by the courts as valid criteria
10. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 453, and specifically subsection (b) (1)
(A)11. The essential difference between a "stockholder" and a "creditor" was
pointed out by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in United States v.
Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 133 F.2d 990, 993 (6th Cir. 1943) as follows:
The essential difference between a stockholder and a creditor is that
the stockholder's intention is to embark upon the corporate adventure,
taking the risks of loss attendant -pon it, so that he may enjoy the
chances of profit. The creditor, on the other hand, does not intend to take
such risks so far as they may be avoided, but merely to lend his capital
to others who do intend to take them. [Emphasis in original].
See also, Wilshire & W. Sandwiches, Inc. v. Comm'r, 175 F.2d 718, 721 (9th Cir.
19493, and Emanuel N. Kolkey, 27 T.C. 37 (1956), aff'd, 254 F.2d 51 (7th Cir.1958).
[Vol. 32
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in distinguishing a sale from an equity contribution, and (ii) to suggest a
sensible test for future use in resolving this issue.
The courts have been careful to point out that no single test or factor
standing alone will generally be decisive. 12 Rather, only when all of the
factors are considered together will the scales weigh in favor of a sale or
an equity contribution. 3 The initial inquiry is now usually phrased in
terms of determining the "true intention" of the parties, 14 which is but a
paraphrase of the well-established tax doctrine that substance will prevail
over form.'5 This type of test standing alone, however, is of little value since
the controlling intention is neither that found in the testimony of the share-
holders nor that reflected on the face of the transfer documents; but, rather,
it is the "true intention" which must be gleaned from the court's examination
of all the surrounding facts and circumstances. 6 The major shortcoming of
such a test is that it fails to specify the weight to be given the presence or
absence of any particular fact or circumstance, and consequently there is
no uniformity in the decisions. The factors have been variously character-
ized by the courts, and they overlap to a great extent. They can, however,
be categorized for purposes of this discussion into the following basic groups.
A. Accouterments of a Sale. As noted above, the substance of the trans-
action, rather than its form, is controlling in determining the proper tax
treatment to be accorded the alleged sale. The question of whether the
transaction is in substance, as well as in form, a sale is essentially one
of fact.17 The burden of proof of this fact falls on the taxpayer as a
result of the presumption of correctness accorded the deficiency as-
sessment.' 8 The courts are willing to give some weight to the bare
12. John Kelley Co. v. Comm'r, 326 U.S. 521 (1946); Talbot Mills, 3 T.C.
95, 99 (1944), aff'd, 146 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1944), aff'd, 326 U.S. 521 (1946);
Proctor Shop, Inc., 30 B.T.A. 721, 725 (1934), aff'd, 82 F.2d 792 (9th Cir.
1936); Emanuel N. Kolkey, supra note 11; Gooding Amusement Co., 23 T.C. 408
(1954), aff'd, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957).
13. Charles E. Curry, 43 T.C. 667 (1965); Gooding Amusement Co., supra
note 12; Aqualane Shores, Inc., 30 T.C. 519 (1958), aff'd, 269 F.2d 116 (5th Cir.
1959); Foresun, Inc., 41 T.C. 706 (1964), nodified and aff'd, 348 F.2d 1006 (6th
Cir. 1965).
14. Gooding Amusement Co., supra note 12; Proctor Shop, Inc., supra note 12.
15. 1432 Broadway Corp., 4 T.C. 1158 (1945), aff'd, 160 F.2d 885 (2d Cir.
1947); and Sherwood Memorial Gardens, Inc., 42 T.C. 211 (1964), aff'd, 350 F.2d
225 (7th Cir. 1965).
16. Isador Dobkin, 15 T.C. 31, 33 (1950), aff'd, 192 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1951);
Gooding Amusement Co., supra note 12. Proctor Shop, Inc., supra note 12.
17. Gooding Amusement Co., supra note 12; Burr Oaks Corp., 43 T.C. 635(1965), aff'd, 365 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1007 (1967);
Marsan Realty Corp., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1513 (1963); Evwalt Dev. Corp.,
22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 220 (1963); F. Devere Fleming, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1284 (1966); Arthur M. Rosenthal, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1373 (1965).
18. Gilbert v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
1967]
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facts that the transaction was cast in the form of a sale rather than
an equity contribution.19  Before doing so, however, courts will
burrow behind the surface of the transaction as reflected by the face of the
transfer documents and bookkeeping entries to determine whether the ac-
couterments of a sale are present.20 These accouterments include a purchase
price approaching the fair market value of the property.21 A sale in excess
of that amount will be viewed as an attempt to participate in the future
profits of the business, a right normally enjoyed only by the equity owners 22
If there is no other clear evidence available, an independent appraisal of
the property to be sold cannot be too strongly suggested, and the sales price
should not vary from it without substantial reasons.
The accouterments of a sale also include a down payment.23 In more
than one decision 24 the court rejected what appeared at first glance to be a
substantial down payment by showing it to be in reality a mere circulation
of checks of no economic substance.
Written notes or evidence of indebtedness as well as a mortgage or
other security device affording normal creditor protection on the deferred
purchase money are considered normal paraphernalia of a sale.25 To be
given weight the courts require the security device to be fully perfected. 26 A
reasonable rate of interest on the deferred purchase notes is also germane.27
1002 (1959); Charles E. Curry, supra note 13; Evwalt Dev. Corp., 22 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 220 (1963); Harry F. Shannon, 29 T.C. 702 (1958).
19. Crawford Drug Stores, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.2d 292 (10th Cir.
1955); Charles E. Curry, supra note 13; and Emanuel N. Kolkey, siapra note 11.
20. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918); and Emanuel N. Kolkey,
supra note 11.21. In the majority of the decisions considering this issue, the sale at an in-
flated price has been a factor given much emphasis by the courts. Thus, see, Burr
Oaks Corp., supra note 17; Piedmont Corp., 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1344 (1966);
Marsan Realty Corp., supra note 17; Arthur M. Rosenthal, supra note 17; Aqua-
lane Shores, Inc., supra note 13; Emanuel N. Kolkey, supra note 11; Ainslie Per-
rault, 25 T.C. 439 (1955); and F. Devere Fleming, supra note 17. The requirement
seems to be not that the sales price be exactly equal to the fair market value, but
rather that it be within the range of reason. Charles E. Curry, supra note 13.
22. Cf., Arthur M. Rosenthal, supra note 17, holding that an excessive sales
price alone is not decisive and the transaction may stand as a sale with the ex-
cessive purchase price being held to be a disguised dividend.
23. Aqualane Shores, Inc., supra note 13.
24. Thus, in Aqualane Shores, Inc., supra note 13, the court found the down
payment to be in reality a mere circulation of checks. Likewise, in Foresun, Inc.,
.pra note 13, the down payment obtained by placing a loan on the property
prior to the transfer and contributing it to the corporation which in turn "paid"
it to the seller as a down payment was held "mere window dressing."
25. Marsan Realty Corp., supra note 17.
26. Ibid.
27. Piedmont Corp., supra note 21; Charles E. Curry, supra note 13.
[Vol. 32
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Equally important is the maturity date of the notes.2 8 An unusually long
term indicates an intention to share in the corporate adventure.2 9 Each of
these factors seems proper for the courts to consider. The variance of a
given transaction from the conventional form of a sale, however, should
not be overly criticized until the variance has been scrutinized in light of
local or industry custom as reflected by similar transactions. 29 a
B. Subordination of Security Interest to Other Creditors. The courts are
quick to examine a transaction to determine whether the noteholder has
subordinated his security interest or right to payment to other creditors of
the business. The inquiry is first whether the shareholder has, under the pro-
visions of local law, accepted a priority behind that of the present or future
general creditors of the business.30 Accepting a priority behind those creditors
to whom conventional lending institutions would be willing to be sub-
ordinated is not found as indicative of an intent to create an equity in-
terest.3 ' Although not always mentioned by the courts, while the noteholders
may often be in equality with the other general creditors of the business, it
is the unusual case when their interests are subordinate to them under
local law. The question which is probably more crucial in the majority of
the decisions is whether the noteholder has in practice subordinated his
interest to that of general creditors.3 2 This question is easily resolved.
The court need merely determine whether the corporate entity has dil-
igently met its payment schedule, both principal and interest. Except in
the unusual case and for sound business reasons,33 the court will not
overlook that the noteholders have consistently deferred payments of
principal and interest in favor of other creditors of the business. The
courts feel that the noteholders, by refusing to enforce their right to
28. Foresun, Inc., supra note 13.
29. Charles E. Curry, supra note 13.
29a. Ibid.
30. Charles E. Curry, supra note 13; and Foresun, Inc., supra note 13.
31. Charles E. Curry, supra note 13.
32. The failure to keep interest current and pay the notes when due has
been noted in substantially all of the decisions considering the debt versus equity
issue. Whether or not it is proper to do so is an interesting question in that it
could be argued that the inquiry should be directed at the evidence of indebtedness
only at the time of issue. The courts, however, give the failure to pay interest
and principal heavy emphasis. See, for example, Emanuel N. Kolkey, supra note
11. Perhaps, even under the test suggested later herein, the failure in fact to pay
would bear on the question of whether the expectation of payment was "reason-
able." See, Burr Oaks Corp., supra note 17; Aqualane Shores, Inc., supra note 13;
Foresun, Inc., supra note 13; Emanuel N. Kolkey, supra; Gooding Amusement Co.,
supra note 12; Warren H. Brown, 27 T.C. 27 (1956); F. Devere Fleming, supra
note 17.
33. Arthur M. Rosenthal, supra note 17.
1967]
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prompt payment regardless of the performance of the business, are treating
their evidences of indebtedness as equity. Another device for subordinating
the interest of the noteholder to trade creditors is to provide in the note
that repayment shall be made only out of earnings of the business (or
out of earnings in excess of a specified dollar amount). The courts have
frowned on such provisions 34 and they are to be avoided. A better indica-
tion of a noteholder accepting the risks attendant equity ownership would
be hard to imagine.
It is submitted that, in furtherance of an attempt to formulate a
single test to be applied in this sale versus equity contribution area, the
various factors grouped under "accouterments" and "subordination" can
be expressed as evidence of part one of a two-part test. Part one of the
recommended test is "whether the debt instruments comply with arm's
length standards." Under this test, the fpurchase price and down payment
and the debt's form, terms, conditions, and treatment in practice must
all be consistent with those arrived at in arm's length dealings. The balance
of the test will be set forth after a discussion of several more groups of
the factors considered by the courts.
C. Business Purpose. The question of whether the existence of a
business purpose is a proper criterion to consider in making the sale or
equity contribution decision is far from settled. The Tax Court 5 has con-
sistently placed heavy emphasis on the independent non-tax or business
motive for a sale (rather than a contribution) of the assets to the corpora-
tion. A good example of a decision in which such a non-tax motive was
given considerable weight is Warren H. Brown."6 There the Tax Court
accepted as a legitimate business purpose for the sale the vehement ob-
jections of the more conservative owner of a business to transferring cer-
tain equipment to the corporation. He did not want to subject it to risks
involved in a proposed program of expansion. The Circuit Courts in such
cases as Suan Properties, Inc. v. United States,3 7 on the other hand, are
quite firm in holding that a sale is not required to have any business pur-
34. Piedmont Corp., supra note 21; Emanuel N. Kolkey, supra note 11; War-
ren H. Brown, supra note 32; and Sherwood Memorial Gardens, Inc., supra note 15.
35. Charles E. Curry, supra note 13; Emanuel N. Kolkey, supra note 11;
Warren H. Brown, supra note 32; Sherwood Memorial Gardens, Inc., supra note
15; and Gooding Amusement Co., supra note 12.
36. 27 T.C. 27 (1956).
37. 220 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1955). See also, Marsan Realty Corp., supra note
17, and the comments contained in Hickman, Incorporation and Capitalization, 40
TAxEs 974, 985 (1962); Nassau Lens Co. v. Comm'r, 308 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1962);
Rowan v. Comm'r., 219 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1955).
[Vol. 32
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pose beyond that of realizing a capital gain. There the court pointed out
that there are many' situations in which the acceptance of a transaction's
form for tax purposes will depend on the existence of an independent
business purpose. 38 It stated, however, that it would be most reluctant to
impose such a court-made rule for sales since it is common knowledge that
vast numbers of sales are made for the purpose of taking gains and
losses at times which provide the optimum tax benefits.3 9 The business
purpose for the existence of the alleged indebtedness has received some-
what less emphasis of late. 40 The better rule would draw no inference
from the lack of a business (non-tax-motivated) reason for the selection
of a sale over an equity contribution since an opportunity to recognize a
capital gain seems to be sufficient justification for the selection. The im-
portant inquiry is "what in fact was done," and the queston of why it
was done is unimportant. If a bona fide sale creating arm's length deferred
purchase money rights in the seller is effected (i.e., if the transaction has
economic substance under the test suggested below) that it was done
for tax motives is inconsequential. To hold otherwise would seriously
jeopardize all tax planning. Rather, if a business purpose should be con-
sidered at all it would be more appropriate to consider it only as evidence
of the presence of other factors, such as the reasonable expectation of pay-
ment, rather than as direct criterion itself. Whatever the rule in theory
should be, however, in light of present case law it would be naive to plan
a sale to a newly-organized corporation without giving some consideration
to developing or refining a business purpose for a sale rather than a con-
tribution. Corporate minutes, records, and general correspondence reflecting
and supporting the business motive should be preserved.
D. Undercapitalization. The question of whether a newly-organized
corporation is undercapitalized, in light of its stated objectives and esti-
mated cost of embarking upon the corporate journey, is considered as
a factor in virtually all of the cases attempting to resolve the issue of
sales versus equity contribution. 41 The term "undercapitalization" (or
sometimes called "thin capitalization") is often used by the courts, but
generally without much indication as to the meaning then being ascribed
38. E.g., recognition of a corporate reorganization, of a corporate entity, or
of a sale and leaseback arrangement.
39. Sun Properties, Inc. v. United States, supra note 37.
40. Hickman, The Thin Corporation-Another Look at an Old Disease, 19"H
ANNUAL FED. TAx CONF. OF CHICAGO LAW ScHooL, p. 883 (1966).
41. Burr Oaks Corp., supra note 17; Emanuel N. Kolkey, supra note 11; and
Sherwood Memorial Gardens, Inc., supra note 15.
19671
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to it. Unfortunately, the term is often used to express the conclusion that
an instrument purportedly representing a debt obligation of the corporation
will not be recognized as such for tax purposes. The real purpose the
term is designed to serve, however, is not to reflect such a conclusion but
rather to be a factor to be weighed in arriving at the conclusion. It should
also be pointed out that the sale versus equity contribution question is
but a species of the broader debt or equity issue, which includes not only
"sales" but also simple "loans" of cash in exchange for debt instruments.
For the reasons which will become apparent below, the undercapitalization
factor is probably the single most important factor to be understood in
planning a sale to a controlled corporation.
The general rule is that the existence of an excessively debt-laden
capital structure is a factor which will be weighed but will not alone decide
the sale or capital contribution issue.42 Thus, courts have found the trans-
fer to be an equity contribution rather than a sale after they specifically
held that the capital structure and debt-equity ratios were sound.43 To
compound confusion in this area, however, there are a number of cases
stating that the inquiry into the thinness of capitalization of the corpora-
tion is not, without more, proper or germane to the issue of whether the
transaction should be recognized as a sale.44 Such cases have themselves
limited their holding to the situation where only the debt-equity ratio is
being considered and none of the other factors tending to indicate equity
rather than debt are present.45 It is submitted that a good deal of this
confusion is due to the failure of the courts to define precisely what is
meant by the term "thin capitalization" or "undercapitalization" when
cited as a factor to be weighed in the sale versus equity contribution issue.
It may safely be said that the cases in the thin capitalization area are not al-
ways consistent40 and an attempt to reconcile even the major decisions would
be beyond the scope of this effort. In fact, it appears that the various
Circuit Courts are presently at odds on what are the proper criteria to be
considered in determining whether a corporation is "thinly capitalized. '47
For some time the thinness of a corporate capital structure was
42. Gooding Amusement Co., supra note 12.
43. Ibid.
44. See, e.g., Sun Properties, Inc. v. United States, supra note 37.
45. Ibid.
46. For an excellent study of the thin capitalization issue, see Caplin, The
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measured or gauged almost entirely in terms of the "debt-equity ratio."48
Although the courts still mention the ratio in their decisions today,
49
the ratio, standing alone, seems to be of only make-weight consequence.
Courts have found sales (i.e., true debt) when the debt-equity ratio was
as high as 320:150 and 50:151 while finding equity contributions (i.e., not
true debt) with ratios as low as 1:152 and 3:1. 3 The once-cited rules of
thumb for a "safe" debt-equity ratio54 are now generally rejected in favor
of an only slightly more analytical "shot gun" approach seeking the "intent"
of the alleged seller.
The question raised by the undercapitalization factor for present pur-
poses is two-fold. First, it must be determined what is meant by the term
"undercapitalization" when cited as criterion to be used in distinguishing a
sale from an equity contribution. Only when the meaning of the term is
clearly in mind is it worthwhile to consider the second question; namely,
whether "undercapitalization" is a proper factor to be weighed in the sale
versus equity contribution question. Rather than attempting to set forth
all the various theories of the case supporting the thin capitalization
issue, an effort will be made to present what seems to be the proper
theoretical test to determine the existence of this factor, yet a test which
is sufficient for planning purposes in light of the present confused status
of the law. It is submitted that much of the loose language in the decisions
such as "assets being at the risk of the business" or "risk capital" or
"capital cushions" could be clarified or eliminated if the courts could em-
ploy a consistent and meaningful test in this area.
The suggested test is not based on language from any one decision
so much as it is on an examination of many of the later cases and a
condensation of what is felt to be the general attitude permeating the
48. See John Kelley Co. v. Comm'r, supra note 12. Caplin, supra note 46,
states that the period 1946-1956 can be called the Age of Ratios, coming to an
end with the Gooding decision.
49. The courts which have persisted in considering the thin capitalization
issue in terms of the debt-equity ratio as well as those that search for a "sub-
stantial" amount of capital will accept as additional property contributed (as
opposed to sold) good will and other intangible items if a value, however tenuous,
can be placed thereon. Ainslie Perrault, supra note 21; and Gooding Amusement
Co., supra note 12.
50. Aqualane Shores, Inc., supra note 13.
51. Hoguet Real Estate Corp., 30 T.C. 580 (1958).
52. Gooding Amusement Co., supra note 12.
53. Ainslie Perrault, supra note 21.
54. Cf., Treusch, Corporate Distributions and Adjustments: Recent Case Re-
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decisions that have at least attempted to delve into the heart of this
issue. Basically, the test may be stated as follows: A corporation will not
be found to be undercapitalized "if its capital structure is economically
realistic when considered in light of the nature of its corporate objectives."
In turn, whether a capital structure is "economically realistic" means
"whether the corporation can reasonably be expected to service the debt
currently and repay the principal amount as it comes due."55 The exist-
ence of such an "economically realistic" capital structure should halt
further assault by the commissioner. There simply exists no statutory
authority or judicial doctrine which permits the commissioner to reshuffle
a capital structure as "thin" if this test is satisfied.56 The test suggested
herein as an accurate expression of the "undercapitalization" factor is the
second part of the two-part test urged as the true test in the sale versus
equity contribution issue.
The question of whether the corporation can "reasonably" be expected
to repay the loan is in the nature of a reasonable man test rather than
whether a conventional lender would make the same loan. Since an income
statement does not reflect certain cash payments, such as amortization of
the principal amount of a debt or the creation of reserves for contingencies,
and since certain non-cash items, such as depreciation, appear as expenses
reducing income, cash-flow projections would probably be more technically
accurate than projections of profits.
Shareholder loans to the corporation after the alleged sale in order
to assist it in accomplishing its corporate objectives have been held to be
55. See the test urged in Hickman, supra note 40. This attitude can be seen
lurking in the shadows in both the Tax Court and the Circuit Court decisions.
See the Circuit Court decisions of Nassau Lens Co. v. Comm'r, supra note 37; and
Gloucester Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Comm'r, 298 F.2d 183 (1st Cir. 1962). In
Charles E. Curry, supra note 13, the Tax Court stated that the simple fact that
the notes took on a degree of risk of the business would not mean they had no
reasonable expectation of being paid. See also Burr Oaks Corp., supra note 17;
Evwalt Development Corp., supra note 17; Marsan Realty Corp., supra note 17;
and Charles D. Vantress, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 711 (1964). Of course, whether
the expectation of payment is reasonable is more easily determined in a proven
business rather than one which is untried. Compare Burr Oaks Corp., supra, with
Ainslie Perrault, supra note 21, and Sheldon Tauber, 24 T.C. 179 (1955), ques-
tioned, David v. Phinney, 350 F.2d 371, 367 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
983, retd. denied, 384 U.S. 958 (1966).
56. Since 1954 there have been several proposed legislative solutions in the
debt equity area. See II ALI FED. INCOME TAX STAT. 231 (Feb. 1954 draft); ABA
SECTION OF TAXATION, 1956 PROGRAM AND COMMITrEE REPORTS TO BE PRESENTED
AT THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING, 36-38 (1958); and SUBCHAPTER C, AD-
visoRY GRouP REPORT ON CORPORATE DISTIBUTIONS AND ADJUSTMENTS, SUB-
COMMITrEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COM-
MITTEE 20 (Dec. 24, 1957).
[Vol. 32
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [1967], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol32/iss4/1
AVOIDING SECTION 351
evidence that the original capitalization was not realistic.57 Conventional
bank financing after the sale does not necessarily carry the same stigma.
The proof of its availability may help to cure the shareholder loanY5 Con-
ventional bank financing after the sale will not be helpful, however, if
obtained by the corporation, not because of its earning power or future
prospects, but because of personal guarantees of the shareholders. In fact,
such bank indebtedness itself has been attacked as equity in several recent
decisions.5 9
E. "Risks of the Business" Test. The courts have frequently stated
that the alleged debt should not be recognized as such if the funds loaned
or the properties sold in exchange for notes were "placed at the risks of
the business." The two most common indicia found by the courts to be
evidence of the assets or funds being "at the risks of the business" are (i)
the funds or assets constitute permanent or necessary assets of the busi-
ness, frequently called the "core asset" test and (ii) stockholder debt
was held in direct proportion to the stock ownership. The core asset test,60
as laid down in the cases, is neither well articulated nor particularly re-
sponsive to the issue. The immediate question which comes to mind is
what assets are not to some extent subject to the risks of the business.
That the assets acquired by the issuance of the debt are permanent or
necessary is largely irrelevant to the question of whether the capital struc-
ture is to be recognized for tax purposes. If carried to its logical extreme,
the test would seem to allow only shareholder loans which were incurred
to finance short-lived, non-essential assets.
The second "risks of the business" factor which has been given heavy
emphasis by the courts is that the stockholders of the corporation hold
the debt obligations in the same proportion as their stock.6 ' If this factor
alone was found to have much weight, it would seriously jeopardize many
a closely held business's capital structure. The validity of the factor is
clearer when the stock and the debt are held in different proportions. The
discharge of the indebtedness will then have a substantial economic effect
57. F. Devere Fleming, supra note 17.
58. Emanuel N. Kolkey, supra note 11.
59. See, e.g., Murphy Logging Co. v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 794 (D.
Ore. 1965).
60. Marsan Realty Corp., supra note 17; Burr Oaks Corp., supra note 17;
Charles E. Curry, supra note 13; Sherwood Memorial Gardens, Inc., supra note 15;
Bruce v. Knox, 180 F. Supp. 907 (D. Minn. 1960); and Warren H. Brown, supra
note 32.
61. Piedmont Corp., supra note 21; Charles E. Curry, supra note 13; J. I.
Morgan, Inc., 30 T.C. 881 (1958), Rev'd on other grounds, Commissioner v. Mor-
gan, 272 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1959), and Evwalt Development Corp., supra note 17.
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in that the relative rights of the debt holder and the shareholder to the,
Corporate assets are being' altered with each payment on the debt 2 Al-
though 'this type of factor would at first glance seem to bear on the ques-
tion of whether the debt is true debt or equity, it is submitted that it
is not in reality a proper factor in searching for the existence of a true
sale. Fortunately, to date the courts have not gone so far as to hold that no
debt will be recognized which is held by shareholders in the same ratio
they hold their stock. The existence of a pro rata holding of debt and
stock should be used merely to show that the capitalization is so structured
that the stockholders could be improperly reaping the tax benefits of an
equity interest masquerading as debt. Thereafter, whether the debt is in
fact stock should not be further affected by the proportionate holding of
debt and stock.
The "risks of the business" test, then, will not withstand close scrutiny.
In fact, it is more of a statement of a conclusion than of a test. The more
valid questions appear to be "how substantial are the risks to which the
creditor is subjected" and "whether a creditor would be willing to incur
it." These, however, are the questions posed by the undercapitalization
issue. Regretably, this product of loose thinking is still present in some
of the latter decisions, and therefore cannot be completely ignored in plan-
ning a sale.
F. A Sensible Test. The lack of a clear and sensible test in this area
has lead to the unfortunate "balance of factors" approach to determine
whether a sale is to be recognized as such for tax purposes. This approach
is unfortunate in two respects. First, it fails to specify either (i) a con-
sistent set or group of factors to be considered in all cases or (ii) the weight
to be given any one factor when it is found present. The result has been
that the courts both have considered a different set of factors in almost
every decision and have given varying weight to the same factor in dif-
ferent decisions. Second, the lack of a clear guideline for so long has allowed
numerous irrelevant factors to be nurtured as proper criteria.
The test developed in the discussion above may be stated in its
entirety as follows: A sale to a controlled corporation is to be recognized
as such for tax purposes if (i) the capital structure of the corporation
immediately after the transaction is economically realistic when considered
in light of the nature of its corporate objectives and (ii) the evidences of
indebtedness issued in connection with the transaction comply with arm's
62. See Charles E. Curry, supra note 13.
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length standards. Under this test the traditional tests of business purpose
and core assets do not have to be totally rejected as criteria. They can
survive as evidence to the extent they bear on the questions of whether
the expectation of repayment was realistic and whether the terms of the
debts were based on arm's length standards. The test may admittedly
be difficult to apply in many cases, but it does have the benefit of provid-
ing the inquirer with a clear and uniform expression of his task. Further,
although it is difficult to apply it should not necessarily be totally con-
demned. The courts have managed with some tests at least as nebulous,
a good example being the "reasonably prudent man" test in negligence
cases.
G. Planning the Sale. The sale versus equity cases have presented
over a period of time such diverse approaches to the question of the
proper test of a sale which will be recognized as such for tax purposes
that it is now an extremely difficult area in which to plan with certainty.
Although the test set forth above should sustain a taxpayer in his ultimate
burden before the higher courts, it is probably wise to plan only in light
of the multitude of factors cited by the various tribunals in the presently
favored balance of factors approach. The following factors are offered as
considerations consistent with good planning of a sale to a controlled
corporation in light of the present status of the law. Some of the factors
are set forth reluctantly; it is hoped that mentioning them as consistent
with good planning under the present status of the law will not be viewed
as an endorsement which will serve to perpetuate their appearance in the
opinions.
1. Employ debt instruments which are clear and unambiguous.
2. Use debt instruments which contain arm's length interest rates,
dates of maturity, terms of payments, etc.
3. Sell at price not exceeding fair market value and with a rea-
sonable downpayment.
4. Avoid subordination of debt to general creditors.
5. Avoid proportionate holding of debt and stock.
6. Reflect intention to create debt in corporate records.
7. Document non-tax business motives for selection of sale over
equity contribution.
8. Meet principal and interest payments on debt when due.
9. Substantiate reasonable expectation of payment of debt with
profit and cash-flow projections.
III. BOOT TRANSACTIONS
A second method of intentionally causing a transfer to a controlled
1967]
15
Fisher: Fisher: Conversion of Ordinary Income
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1967
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
corporation to be taxable is the so-called "section 351(b) boot transaction."
Section 351(b) provides that if the transferor receives from the corporation
"money" or "other property" as well as the "stock or securities" permitted
to be received under section 35 1(a), then gain (if any) will be recognized
but not in excess of the money and the fair market value of the other
property received.63 No loss is recognizable in boot transactions." The
clearest example of a boot transaction is when property is transferred in
exchange for stock or securities and a substantial amount of money. This
example, however, is not representative of the normal factual situation since
money is not generally available for distribution in sufficiently large sums
to enable the transferor to recognize as sufficiently large gain.
The crucial terms in section 351 under this technique are "securities"
and "other property." If property is found to be "securities" then no gain
will be recognized, while the opposite is true if the property is found
to be "other property." "Other property" may generally be said to be
anything of value which is neither "stock," "securities," or "money." "Stock,"
of course, means an equity interest. The definition of the term "securities"
is not as clear. It is a tax species of a debt instrument, but its exact
characteristics are not sharply defined. The meaning of the term, however,
is important under this technique and should be examined briefly.
The term "securities" is not defined in either the CODE or the REGULA-
TIONS. It is well settled, however, that the definition is the same for
section 351 as it is for the reorganization provisions of Subchapter C.65
The proper definition to be given the term has been considered in a sizeable
number of decisions. Unfortunately, the decisions have not as yet cul-
minated in a clear set of guidelines as to what constitutes a "security."
Perhaps most representative of the cases is Camp Wolters Enterprises, Inc."6
In that decision, before finding that promissory notes which matured over
a five-year period starting with the sixth year after date of issuance were
63. It appears to be the rule that if a transaction is found to be a "sale,"
then § 351 cannot be applied to cause the non-recognition of gain. Charles E.
Curry, 43 T.C. 667, 697 (1965). However, it has been argued that even if the sale
is found valid and the debt is accepted as real, the debt instruments received
by the seller can still be found to be "securities" and thereby require the applica-
tion of § 351. See, Note, Section 351 Transfers to Controlled Corporations: The
Forgotten Term-"Securities," 114 U. PA. L. REv. 314 (1965).
64. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 351(b) (2).
65. Lloyd-Smith v. Comm'r, 116 F.2d 642, 644 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 313
U.S. 588 (1941).
66. 22 T.C. 737, 750-51 (1954), aff'd, 230 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 826 (1956).
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securities, the Tax Court67 stated the standard to be applied in such cases
is as follows:
The test as to whether notes are securities is not a mechanical
determination of the time period of the note. Though time is an
important factor, the controlling consideration is an over-all eval-
uation of the nature of the debt, degree of participation and con-
tinuing interest in the business, the extent of proprietary interest
compared with the similarity of the note to a cash payment, the
purpose of the advances, etc.
Similarly, the Supreme Court's pronouncement of the basic distinc-
tion between a "security" and other indebtedness is that the former
gives a creditor some "assured participation in the business" while the
latter encompasses short-term loans or debts representing "temporary
advances for current corporate needs." 68 The proper rule would seem to
be that the courts' inquiry should be focused on the evidences of indebted-
ness as they exist at the date of issue. The time when the notes are in
fact paid could also be considered, but only as evidence of the debt holder's
intention to continue participation in the business enterprise.
The courts have considered various factors in determining whether
the evidences of indebtedness represented short-term loans or temporary
advances on the one hand or "securities" on the other. Undeniably, the
emphasis has been on the length of the term of the obligation. Significant
in this regard, in addition to the cases, is a revenue ruling which was
issued but subsequently withdrawn for procedural reasons. Rev. Rul. 56-
30369 in effect held that short-term notes with an average maturity of two
and one-half years were "other property" and not securities for purposes
of section 351. The only factor which was stressed in the ruling was the
term of the notes. Among the other factors the courts have considered,
the following seem important: (i) whether the notes were subordinated to
other debts,70 (ii) whether the notes were issued as part of the integral
initial capitalization of the corporate enterprise as opposed to being issued
as part of an isolated purchase and sale transaction after the formation
of the corporation,71 and (iii) whether the indebtedness in question was
payable on demand. 2
67. Id. at 751.
68. Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Comm'r, 287 U.S. 462 (1933).
69. 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 193 (1956).
70. Camp Wolters Enterprises, Inc., supra note 66.
71. Ibid.
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The often-cited rule of thumb in this area is that obligations of less
than five years in length will not be considered as "securities. 7' 3 For obliga-
tions of longer duration, the rule is that the chances for an obligation to
be held a security are greater as -the duration of the obligation gets longer.
There appear to be no decisions in the last several years on the
question of what constitutes a "security" for purposes of section 351.
The commissioner has not shelved this weapon, however. In fact, the
commissioner has raised the issue on several occasions as an alternative
argument in the event that his contention that the debt was in fact
equity failed. 74 So far the courts have found equity and have not ruled on
the alternative argument.
It is interesting to note that it is not entirely settled as to how section
351(b) applies when more than one item of property is transferred in
exchange for stock or securities and boot. The question is (i) whether
the bases of all the assets are to be totalled to determine total gain or (ii)
whether each asset is to be treated separately. If the answer to question
(ii) is yes, then the additional interesting problem arises as to whether
the gain is to be allocated to the various assets on the basis of their
relative fair market values or their relative bases.75 These problems leave
much uncertainty and make it correspondingly more difficult to plan a
transaction to achieve a desired tax result, such as a stepped-up basis,76
on a specific asset or group of assets.
The transfer of property in exchange for "money" or "other property"
as well as stocks and securities may not always meet the objectives of
the transferor as precisely as the sale technique. First, the step up in basis
of a specific asset can be controlled in a sale, but can be a problem in
a boot transaction if more than one asset is being transferred. Second, while
the sale technique may be reported on the installment method, boot tran's-
actions apparently do not meet the "sale or other disposition" language
73. See Camp Wolters Enterprises, Inc., supra note 66; and BrrrKER AND
EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 73(1966).
74. See Arthur M. Rosenthal, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1373 (1965); Charles
E. Curry, supra note 63; Burr Oaks Corp., 43 T.C. 635 (1965), aff'd, 365 F.2d 24
(7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1007 (1967).
75. See, Rev. Rul. 55-79, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 370 (1955) for a discussion of
how such an allocation is made in connection with the sale of a going business.
76. Bases of assets received by a corporation in a § 351 transfer are de-
termined under § 362, which provides the basis shall be the same as it was in the
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Of section 453. Third, section 1239 does apply to boot transactions, and so
do sections 1245 and 1250.
IV. LiABILIES IN ExcESS OF BASIS
A third method of intentionally causing taxation upon the transfer
of property to a controlled corporation is presented by section 357. Section
357(a) provides the general rule that the assumption of liabilities by the
corporation in a section 351 transfer will not be treated as the receipt of
"money or other property" by the transferor. Section 357 (c), however, pro-
vides that the normal tax free rules of section 351(a) will not apply to ex-
changes if the sum of (i) the liabilities assumed and (ii) the liabilities to
which the property is subject exceeds the total of the adjusted basis of the
property transferred. The excess is "considered as gain from the sale or
exchange of a capital asset or a non-capital asset as the case may be.
The rule of section 357(c) is applied individually to each transferor, but
as to each transferor the total bases of all assets transferred will be balanced
against the liabilities assumed from him or acquired in connection with
property transferred by him. In the case of a transfer of more than one
item, the character of the gain is determined by allocating it ratably over
all the assets in accordance with their fair market values.
The rules of section 357(c) appear to be automatic or mandatory.
The subsection contains no subjective tests or business purpose require-
ments. It would seem therefore that a taxpayer, by mortgaging low-basis
appreciated property prior to transferring it to a corporation, can have
the excess of the mortgage over the basis automatically taxed as gain
and added to the basis of the property in the hands of the corporation.77
If the corporation is in existence at the time the mortgage is placed on
the property, it should be clearly documented that the loan was nego-
tiated, acquired, and distributed to the shareholders prior to the transfer
of the property to the corporation. If the corporation requires the proceeds
of the loan to carry on its corporate objectives and the proceeds of the
loan are contributed to the corporation along with mortgaged property, the
courts may conceivably find the loan to the shareholders was a sham
and that in fact the loan was to the corporation.
One aspect of section 357(c) bears mentioning. The mandatory rule
77. Query whether INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 269 may be an unused weapon
available to the commissioner in attacking these transactions.
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of section 357(c) does not apply if section 357(b) is applicable. 78 Section
357(b) provides generally that if liabilities are acquired or assumed by
the corporation in an exchange and the purpose of the acquisition or
assumption was to avoid Federal income tax, or was without a bona fide
business purpose, the total amount of the liability assumed or acquired
will be treated as boot and taxed to the extent of the gain. The application
of section 357(b) rather than (c) will go against the Service in that
357(b) will normally result in the recognition of more gain to the transferor
and a correspondingly higher basis in the hands of the corporation. It
is doubtful whether the taxpayer could ever employ 357(b) by document-
ing a tax avoidance motive and lack of business purpose for the assump-
tion of the liability. The courts may even construe the section as available
as a tax avoidance weapon to the commissioner, but not as a shield for
the taxpayer. Sections 1239, 1245, and 1250 are applicable in the section
357(c) transfer.
V. INTENTIONAL FAILURE TO MEET "CONTROL" REQUIREMENTS
A fourth method for intentionally avoiding the application of sec-
tion 351 has to do with the control requirements of that section. The
objective under this technique is to plan the transfer in such a manner
that the transfer of the property which is desired to be taxed does not
meet the control requirements so as to avoid the application of the
section. Section 351 applies to a transfer of property to a corporation
in exchange for stock and securities only if "immediately after the ex-
change such person or persons are in control (as defined in section 368(c))
of the corporation." Section 368(c) in turn defines "control" to mean
"the ownership of stock possessing at least 80 per cent of the total com-
bined voting power of all classes of security entitled to vote and at least
80 per cent of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of
the corporation." It is important to point out that the constructive owner-
ship rules are not applicable in determining control under section 368(c)
for purposes of section 351.79
The first of the two 80 per cent tests for "control" seems clear enough.
The Service, however, has determined that the second 80 per cent test
means 80 per cent of each clarss of "other stock" rather than 80 per cent
78. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 357 (c) (2) (A).
79. Rev. Rul. 59-259, 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 115 (1959).
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of the total number of shares of all classes of the "other stock."8' 0 The test
is also 80 per cent of the number of shares outstanding rather than stock
representing 80 per cent of the fair market value of all stock outstanding.
What stock is entitled to vote is to be determined under local law.
It is doubtful whether it includes stock which can only vote on certain
major corporate events, such as mergers and liquidations, or stock with
contingent voting rights prior to the occurrence of the contingency.81 The
existence of restrictive stock agreements affecting the voting rights among
shareholders is probably not to be considered in determining whether the
stock is entitled to vote.
The control requirements of section 351 require that the control exist
"immediately after the exchange" and make no reference to the situation
before the exchange. The regulations state that the phrase does not nec-
essarily require "simultaneous" exchanges by two or more persons, but
comprehends a situation where rights of the parties have been previously
defined and the execution of the agreement proceeds with an expedition
"consistent with orderly procedure. 8s 2 The meaning of this phrase has been
the concern of decisions too numerous to discuss in detail herein. 3 It may
safely be said that they add little for present purposes to the statement
in the Regulations.
Another means of avoiding the control requirements of section 351 has
to do with the transfer of stock or securities in exchange of services ren-
dered or to be rendered. This method will generally not meet the business
objectives of the shareholder and will cause recognition of ordinary in-
come upon receipt of the stock as compensation under section 61. It is,
however, worthy of mention. Stock or securities issued for services ren-
dered or to be rendered are not deemed issued in exchange for "property. 8 4
Thus, if individuals or groups of individuals transfer property to a corpora-
tion for seventy-nine per cent of the stock and one individual who trans-
80. Ibid.
81. See for comparison, Treas. Reg. § 1.302-3 (a) (3) (1966) which gives
such an interpretation to the term "voting stock."
82. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(A)(1) (1966).
83. See Manhattan Bldg. Co., 27 T.C. 1032 (1957); American Bantam Car
Co., 11 T.C. 397 (1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 513 (3rd Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
920 (1950); Fahs v. Florida Mach. & Foundry Co., 168 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1948);
Wilgard Realty, Inc. v. Comm'r, 127 F.2d 514 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
655 (1942); May Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 200 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1953);
S. Klien on the Square, Inc. v. Comm'r, 188 F.2d 127 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 824 (1951). ,
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fers no property receives twenty-one per cent of the stock for services
rendered or to be rendered, section 351 will not apply.
The avoidance of the control requirements will cause the transaction
to be taxed as a sale or exchange under sections 1001 and 1002. Thus, the
advantage of installment reporting and the disadvantage of section 1239
and sections 1245 and 1250 will be present.
VI. CONCLUSION
The discussion above has been provided to make the tax counselor
more aware of the tax benefits of intentionally avoiding section 351. The
techniques set forth above should be employed only after a most careful
analysis of the individual facts, the objective to be achieved, and the
alternatives available to reach that objective. Any transactions cast in a
form to avoid section 351 will most likely be closely scrutinized by the
examining agent, and a final settlement favorable to the taxpayer will
often depend on the quality of the work done by the tax counselor.
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